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In this paper we consider an intrusion tolerant system with two detection modes;
automatic detection mode and manual detection mode for intrusions, which is called SITAR
(Scalable Intrusion Tolerant Architecture), and describe the dynamic transition behavior by
a continuous-time semi-Markov chain (CTSMC). Based on the embedded Markov chain
(EMC) approach, we derive the steady-state probability of the CTSMC, the steady-state
system availability and the mean time to security failure (MTTSF). Especially, we show
necessary and suﬃcient conditions to exist the optimal switching time from an automatic
detection mode to a manual detection mode, which maximizes the steady-state system
availability. Next, we develop an adaptive mode control scheme to estimate the optimal
switching time without specifying the associated probability distribution function, whose
idea behind is based on a statistically non-parametric algorithm by means of the total
time on test concept. Numerical examples through a comprehensive simulation study are
presented for illustrating the optimal switching of detection mode, and investigating the
asymptotic property of the resulting adaptive mode control scheme.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Because Internet is highly vulnerable to Internet epidemics, a lot of attacking events compromise a huge number of
host computers rapidly and cause DoS around the Internet. Such epidemics result in extensive widespread damage costing
billions of dollars, and countering the propagating worms in time becomes an increasingly emergency issue on the Internet
security. The computer network security is designed in several layers. Among them, the security approaches taken in the
system layer are quite effective to protect the information resource from various network attack incidents and to realize
secure computing environments in our daily life.
Although traditional security approaches which may be categorized into intrusion-detection approaches establish proactive
barriers such as a ﬁrewall, unfortunately, the eﬃciency of a single barrier is not still enough to prevent attacks from sophis-
ticated new skills by malicious attackers. As the result, the number of network attack incidents is tremendously increasing
still now on. In contrast to pursue the nearly impossibility of a perfect barrier unit, the concept of intrusion tolerance is
becoming much popular in recent years. An intrusion tolerant system can avoid severe security failures caused by intrusion
and/or attack, and can provide intended services to users in a timely manner even under attack. This is inspired from tra-
ditional techniques commonly used for tolerating accidental faults in hardware and/or software systems, and can provide
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placed on the service it delivers [1].
Much efforts in security have been focused on speciﬁcation, design and implementation issues. In fact, several imple-
mentation techniques of intrusion tolerance at the architecture level have been developed for real computer-based systems.
For an excellent survey on this research topic, see Deswarte and Powell [2]. Since the above methods can be categorized
by a design diversity technique in secure systems and need much cost for the development, the effect on implementation
has to be evaluated carefully and quantitatively. To assess quantitatively security/dependability effects of computer-based
systems, reliability/performance evaluation techniques with stochastic modeling are quite effective.
Littlewood et al. [8] applied fundamental techniques in reliability theory to assess the security of operational software
systems and proposed some quantitative security measures. Jonsson and Olovsson [6] also developed a quantitative method
to study attacker’s behavior with the empirical data observed in experiments. Ortalo, Deswarte and Kaaniche [11] used both
privilege graph and continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC) to evaluate system vulnerability, and derived the mean effort to
security failure. Uemura and Dohi [13,15] focused on the typical DoS (Denial of Service) attacks for a server system and
formulated an optimal patch management problem via continuous-time semi-Markov chains (CTSMCs).
Later, the same authors [14] considered a secure design of an intrusion tolerant database system [20,23] with a control
parameter to switch an automatic detection mode to a manual detection mode after receiving an attack, and described
its stochastic behavior by a CTSMC. Park et al. [12] considered an M/G/1 queueing model to model an intrusion tolerant
server. Uemura et al. [17] also considered the stochastic behavior of an IMS-based VoIP network system with intrusion
tolerance. In this way considerable attentions have been paid to stochastic modeling in security/dependability evaluation of
computer-based systems.
In this paper we consider an existing system architecture with intrusion tolerance, called SITAR (Scalable Intrusion Tol-
erant Architecture). The SITAR was developed in MCNC Inc. and Duke University [22]. The main purpose of this paper is
to describe the SITAR with two detection modes; automatic detection mode and manual detection mode by a CTSMC and
derive the optimal switching time, which maximizes the steady-state system availability in a continuous time. We also
develop a statistically non-parametric algorithm to estimate the optimal switching time without specifying the associated
probability distribution function, based on the total time on test concept [3].
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the related work with this paper. In Sec-
tion 3 we overview the SITAR and describe the fundamental stochastic behavior of it [9,10]. Section 4 takes the embedded
Markov chain (EMC) approach and obtains the representation of an embedded discrete-time Markov chain (DTMC) in the
steady state for the CTSMC model. We derive the steady-state probability in the CTSMC by using the mean sojourn time and
the steady-state probability in the embedded DTMC. Next we formulate the maximization problem of steady-state system
availability in continuous time and show necessary and suﬃcient conditions to exist the optimal switching time from an
automatic detection mode to a manual detection mode. In addition to the availability analysis we analytically derive the
mean time to security failure (MTTSF) along with the EMC approach.
In Section 5, we develop a statistically non-parametric algorithm to estimate the optimal switching time, where the
total time on test concept is useful to obtain the resulting estimator. We translate the underlying optimization problem
on analysis to a graphical one, and derive an estimator of the optimal switching time with the complete sample of the
transition time data to an automatic detection mode. Numerical examples are presented in Section 6 for illustrating the op-
timal switching of detection mode and investigating the asymptotic property of the resulting estimator. Here, we develop a
simulator to examine the convergence property of estimators of the optimal switching time and its associated dependability
measures. Finally the paper is concluded with some remarks in Section 7. All proofs for mathematical propositions are give
in Appendix A.
2. Related work
Madan et al. [9,10] consider the security evaluation of SITAR and proposed a CTSMC model to describe the dynamic
stochastic behavior. More precisely, they investigated effects of the intrusion tolerant architecture under some attack patterns
such as DoS attacks. Based on the EMC approach, they derived not only the steady-state probability of the CTSMC and the
steady-state system availability but also the MTTSF. However, they assumed in their model that all transition times are
random variables. Uemura et al. [18] introduced a preventive maintenance time such as a patch release time for the SITAR
and showed that releasing a security patch at a suitable (constant) timing enables to improve the steady-state system
availability effectively. Though their model is a special case of [10] with a deterministic transition time, introduction of the
optimal patch release policy by maximizing the steady-state system availability is a new idea. Wang et al. [21] developed a
stochastic reward nets (SRNs) model for the SITAR. Fujimoto et al. [5] also considered the similar model as [18] by means
of Markov regenerate stochastic Petri nets (MRSPNs) which belong to a wider class of stochastic process than CTSMCs.
On the other hand, recently, the same authors [16,19] introduced an additional control parameter, called the switching
time from an automatic detection mode to a manual detection mode for intrusions, into the SITAR, and showed that the
similar effect to increase the steady-state system availability can be obtained by controlling the switching time. However,
it is worth noting that they assumed the discrete-time operation of the SITAR and developed a discrete-time semi-Markov
chain (DTSMC) model. The basic idea on switching from an automatic detection mode to a manual detection mode of
vulnerability is due to [14,23] in the context of an intrusion tolerant database system.
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In contrast, we consider the same problem in continuous-time setting and develop a CTSMC model. Based on the EMC
approach, we derive not only the steady-state probability of the CTSMC and the steady-state system availability but also the
MTTSF. In addition to the difference between CTSMC and DTSMC, there are no work on the statistical estimation algorithm
on the optimal switching time from an automatic detection mode to a manual detection mode for intrusions, into the
SITAR. The statistical estimation scheme proposed here can be used for scheduling of mode change under the incomplete
knowledge of intrusion-detection time under autonomic mode control [7]. In other words, it provides an adaptive control
scheme of intrusion-detection function within an intrusion tolerant system. In COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) distributed
servers like SITAR, the intrusion-detection function equipped for a proactive security management is not perfect and is often
switched to a manual detection mode, in order to detect intrusions/vulnerable parts more speedy (see [14,23]). Then this
algorithm would be quite useful because it is not so easy to identify the transition probability in the real-time operation of
SITAR. This paper is the complete version of our conference paper [4] with the detailed mathematical proofs and extensive
simulation results.
3. SITAR
The SITAR is a COTS distributed server with an intrusion tolerant function [22] and consists of ﬁve major components;
proxy server, acceptance monitor, ballot monitor, adaptive reconﬁguration module, and audit control module. Since the usual
COTS server is vulnerable for an intrusion from outside, an additional intrusion tolerant structure is introduced in the SITAR.
Fig. 1 shows the conﬁguration of SITAR. It can be checked that the part denoted by a dotted square can function as an
intrusion tolerance to the vulnerable end servers S1, S2, . . . , Si , where Pi , Bi and Ai in the functional blocks are the logical
functions to be executed to satisfy a given service request.
Proxy servers represent public access points for the intrusion tolerant services being provided (e.g. a decision support
system for military command and control, or a transaction processing system for an E-commerce site). All requests come
into one of the proxy servers depending on the service needs. The proxy server enforces the service policy speciﬁed by the
current intrusion tolerant strategy. The policy determines which COTS servers the request should be forwarded to, and how
the results from these servers should be adjudicated to arrive at the ﬁnal response. A new request by the proxy server to
the appropriate COTS servers is made on behalf of the original client, as depicted by the thin lines from the proxy servers
to the COTS servers. Relevant ballot monitors and acceptance monitors are also informed of this decision.
When the responses (signiﬁed by the thick lines from right to left) are generated by the COTS servers, they are ﬁrst
processed by the acceptance monitors. The acceptance monitors apply certain validity check to the responses, forwarding
them to the ballot monitors along with an indication of the check result. The acceptance monitors also detect signs of
compromise on the COTS servers and produce intrusion triggers for the adaptive reconﬁguration module. The ballot monitors
serve as “representatives” for the respective COTS servers and decide on a ﬁnal response through either a simple majority
voting or Byzantine agreement process. The actual process taken will depend on the current level of detected security threat.
The ﬁnal response is forwarded to the proxy servers to be delivered to the remote client. The adaptive reconﬁguration
module receives intrusion trigger information from all other modules, evaluates intrusion threats, the tolerance objectives,
and the cost/performance impact, and generates new conﬁgurations for the system. Since it is assumed that any individual
component can be compromised, the backup adaptive reconﬁguration module is provided to guard against the adaptive
reconﬁguration module becoming a single point of failure.
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The audit control module provides means for auditing the behavior of all the other components in the intrusion tolerant
system. All system modules maintain audit logs with signature protection. These logs can be veriﬁed through the audit
control module. Additional diagnostic tests can be conducted through the audit control module. Intrusion triggers are dis-
tributed among three sets of modules. The triggers in the acceptance monitors are responsible for detecting compromised
COTS servers. The triggers in the proxy servers are for detecting external attacks, and the triggers in the audit control will
help the security administrator to monitor the secure operation of all the new functional blocks in our architecture through
active auditing.
Madan et al. [9,10] described the stochastic behavior of SITAR by means of CTSMC and gave its embedded DTMC repre-
sentation. Fig. 2 depicts the block diagram of SITAR behavior under consideration. Let G be the normal state in which the
COTS server can protect itself from adversaries. However, if a vulnerable part is detected by them, a state transition occurs
from G to the vulnerable state V . Further if adversaries attack the vulnerable part, the state moves to the attack state A. On
the other hand, if the vulnerable part is detected by vulnerability identiﬁers such as benign users, the vulnerable state V
goes back to the normal state G again.
In the attack state A, two possible states can be taken. If the problem caused by the attack cannot be resolved and the
containment of the damaged part fails, the corresponding event can be regarded as a security failure, and the initializa-
tion/reconﬁguration of the system is performed as a corrective maintenance (repair) at DL. After completing it, the system
state makes a transition to G again and becomes as good as new. While, if the intrusion/attack are detected, then the state
goes to C . In the state C , one of two instantaneous transitions without time delay, which are denoted by dotted-lines in
Fig. 2, can occur, i.e., if the damaged part by attacking is not so signiﬁcant and does not lead to a serious security failure
directly, the system state makes a transition from C to MC with probability 1 − p (0 p  1), and the damaged part can
be contained by means of the fail safe function. After the containment, the system state moves back to G by masking the
damaged part.
Otherwise, i.e. if the containment of the damaged part with serious effects to the system fails, the state goes to TR with
probability p. We call this probability the triage probability in this paper. In the triage state TR, several corrective inspections
are tried in parallel with services. If the system is diagnosed as security failure, the state moves to F , the service operation is
stopped, and the recovery operation starts immediately. After completing the recovery from the failure, the system becomes
as good as new in G . Otherwise, it goes to the so-called non-failure state denoted by C2. Here, two states can be taken;
it may be switched to the gracefully service degradation in GD with probability q (0  q  1), or the service operation is
forced to stop and the corrective maintenance starts immediately.
The main differences from Madan et al. [9,10] are (i) an automatic intrusion-detection can be switched to a manual
detection mode at any timing in A, although Madan et al. [9,10] did not take account of switching of automatic de-
tection mode, (ii) in two states C and C2 instantaneous transitions are allowed in the present model, although Madan
et al. [9,10] assumed random transitions with time delay. We deﬁne the time interval from G to G as one cycle and
suppose that the same cycle repeats again and again over an inﬁnite time horizon. For respective states, let Fi, j(t)
(i, j ∈ {G, V , A,DL,C,MC,TR,C2, FS,GD, F }) denote the continuous transition probability distributions with probability den-
sity function (p.d.f.) f i, j(t) in CTSMC, where the mean is given by μi, j (> 0).
In Fig. 3, we give the transition diagram of CTSMC. It is assumed that the automatic detection function in SITAR is
switched just after t0 ( 0) time unit elapses in an active attack state A in CTSMC. More speciﬁcally, let F A,DL(t) be the
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transition probability from A to DL which denotes the manual detection mode. When it is given by the step function, i.e.,
F A,DL(t) = 1 (t  t0) and F A,DL(t) = 0 (t < t0), the switching time from an automatic detection mode to a manual detection
model is given by the constant time t0 (decision variable). From the preliminary above, we formulate the steady-state system
availability as a function of the switching time t0 in the following section.
4. Probabilistic analysis
4.1. EMC approach
The embedded DTMC representation of CTSMC is illustrated in Fig. 4. Let pk , hk and πk denote the steady-state prob-
ability of CTSMC in Fig. 3, the mean sojourn time and the steady-state probability of the embedded DTMC in Fig. 4,
respectively, where k ∈ {G, V , A,DL,MC,TR, FS,GD, F }. From the deﬁnition, we can derive the steady-state probability πk
of CTSMC by
πG = hG/φ, (1)
πV = hV /φ, (2)
πA = pAhA/φ, (3)
πDL = pA(1− pMC − pTR)hDL/φ, (4)
πMC = pA pMChMC/φ, (5)
πTR = pA pTRhTR/φ, (6)
πFS = pA pTRpFShFS/φ, (7)
πGD = pA pTRpGDhGD/φ, (8)
πF = pA pTR(1− pFS − pGD)hF /φ, (9)
where
φ = hG + hV + pA
[
hA + (1− pMC − pTR)hDL + pMChMC
+ pTR
{
hTR + pFShFS + pGDhGD + (1− pFS − pGD)hF
}]
. (10)
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4.2. CTSMC model
From the transition diagram of CTSMC in Fig. 3, we obtain
pA =
∞∫
0
F V ,G(t)dFV ,A(t), (11)
pMC = pMC(t0) = (1− p)F A,C (t0), (12)
pTR = pTR(t0) = pF A,C (t0), (13)
pFS = (1− q)
∞∫
0
F TR,F (t)dFTR,C2(t), (14)
pGD = q
∞∫
0
F TR,F (t)dFTR,C2(t), (15)
where
hG = μG,V , (16)
hV =
∞∫
0
t F V ,G(t)dFV ,A(t) +
∞∫
0
t F V ,A(t)dFV ,G(t), (17)
hA = hA(t0) =
t0∫
0
F A,C (t)dt, (18)
hDL = μDL,G , (19)
hMC = μMC,G , (20)
hTR =
∞∫
0
t F TR,F (t)dFTR,C2(t) +
∞∫
0
t F TR,C2(t)dFTR,F (t), (21)
hFS = μFS,G , (22)
T. Dohi, T. Uemura / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78 (2012) 1751–1774 1757hGD = μGD,G , (23)
hF = μF ,G (24)
and F A,C (t) = 1 − F A,C (t). The steady-state system availability is deﬁned as a fraction of time when the service can be
provided continuously. Hence, the formulation of the steady-state system availability is reduced to the derivation of the
mean sojourn time at each state. It should be noted that the system down states correspond to states DL, FS and F , so that
the steady-state system availability is represented as a function of t0 by
AV(t0) = πG + πV + πA + πMC + πTR + πGD = U (t0)/T (t0), (25)
where
U (t0) = hG + hV + pA
{
hA(t0) + pMC(t0)hMC + pTR(t0)(hTR + pGDhGD)
}
= HG,V +
∞∫
0
F V ,G(t)dFV ,A(t)
{ t0∫
0
F A,C (t)dt + αF A,C (t0)
}
, (26)
T (t0) = U (t0) + pA
[{
1− pMC(t0) − pTR(t0)
}
hDL + pTR(t0)
{
pFShFS + (1− pFS − pGD)hF
}]
= HG,V +
∞∫
0
F V ,G(t)dFV ,A(t)
{ t0∫
0
F A,C (t)dt + μDL,G F A,C (t0) + β F A,C (t0)
}
, (27)
HG,V = μG,V +
∞∫
0
t F V ,G(t)dFV ,A(t) +
∞∫
0
t F V ,A(t)dFV ,G(t), (28)
α = (1− p)hMC + p(hTR + pGDhGD), (29)
β = α + p{pFShFS + (1− pFS − pGD)hF }. (30)
In the above expressions, α and β mean that the mean up time and the total mean time from state C to G for one cycle,
respectively.
4.3. Optimal switching time
Our next concern is to seek the optimal switching time, t∗0, maximizing the steady-state system availability AV(t0) in
Eq. (25). Taking the differentiation of AV(t0) with respect to t0 and setting equal to 0 yield the non-linear equation q(t0) = 0,
where
q(t0) =
{
1+ αrA,C (t0)
}
T (t0) − U (t0)
{
1+ (β − μDL,G)rA,C (t0)
}
(31)
and rA,C (t) = f A,C (t)/F A,C (t) is the hazard rate of the transition time from state A to C . We make the following parametric
assumptions:
(A-1) α + μDL,G < β ,
(A-2) αμDL,G < HG,V (β − α − μDL,G).
From the deﬁnition it is evident that α < β . The assumption (A-1) implies that the sum of mean up time after state C
and the mean corrective maintenance time is strictly smaller than the total mean time from state C to G . On the other
hand, the assumption (A-2) seems to be somewhat technical but is needed to guarantee a unique optimal switching time.
These assumptions were numerically checked and could be validated in many parametric cases. We characterize the optimal
switching time maximizing the steady-state system availability as follows:
Proposition 1.
(1) Suppose that F A,C (t) is strictly IHR (Increasing Hazard Rate) under the assumptions (A-1) and (A-2), i.e., drA,C (t)/dt > 0.
(i) If q(0) > 0 and q(∞) < 0, then there exists a unique optimal switching time t∗0 (0 < t∗0 < ∞) satisfying q(t∗0) = 0. The
corresponding steady-state system availability AV(t∗0) is given by
AV
(
t∗0
)= 1+ αrA,C (t∗0)
1+ (β − μDL,G)rA,C (t∗0)
. (32)
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given by
AV(0) = HG,V
HG,V + μDL,G pA . (33)
(iii) If q(∞) 0, then the optimal switching time is t∗0 → ∞ and the corresponding maximum steady-state system availability is
given by
AV(∞) = HG,V + (μA,C + α)pA
HG,V + (μA,C + β)pA . (34)
(2) Suppose that F A,C (t) is DHR (Decreasing Hazard Rate) under the assumptions (A-1) and (A-2), i.e., drA,C (t) 0. If AV(0) > AV(∞)
then t∗0 = 0 otherwise t∗0 → ∞.
Since t0 is a timing from A to DL in Fig. 3, the policy t∗0 → ∞ means that it is always optimal not to switch to the
manual detection mode. On the other hand, the policy t∗0 = 0 implies that it is optimal to switch to the manual detection
mode just after state moves to the attack state.
4.4. MTTSF analysis
Next, we derive MTTSF [10,18,19]. Let Xa and Xt denote the absorbing states and the transient states in CTSMC. Let
P =
[
Q C
O I
]
(35)
be the whole transition probability matrix, where Q and C denote the transient and the absorbing probability matrices for
Xa = {DL, FS,GD, F } and Xt = {G, V , A,MC,TR} in Fig. 4:
Q =
G V A MC TR
G⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 1 0 0 0 ⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
V pA 0 pA 0 0
A 0 0 0 pMC pTR
MC 1 0 0 0 0
TR 0 0 0 0 0
(36)
and
C =
DL FS GD F
G⎡⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 0 ⎤⎥⎥⎥⎦
V 0 0 0 0
A pMC + pTR 0 0 0
MC 0 0 0 0
TR 0 pFS pGD pFS + pGD
. (37)
In Eq. (35), O and I are the zero matrix whose elements are 0 and the identity matrix, respectively. In Eqs. (36) and (37),
it means that pA = 1− pA , pMC + pTR = 1− pMC − pTR , and pFS + pGD = 1− pFS − pGD . Using the mean visit number Vi and
the mean sojourn time hi in state i, MTTSF is deﬁned by
MTTSF =
∑
i∈Xt
V ihi, (38)
where Vi is the solution of the following simultaneous linear equations:
Vi = qi +
∑
j
V jq ji, i, j ∈ Xt, (39)
and q ji denotes the elements of Q . For the initial probability vector in Eq. (39), we set
q = [qi] = [1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0]. (40)
Finally, solving Eq. (39) yields the mean visit number:
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pA pMC(t0)
, (41)
VV = VG , (42)
V A = pAVG , (43)
VMC = pMC(t0)V A, (44)
VTR = pTR(t0)V A (45)
and leads to the analytical derivation of MTTSF.
5. Adaptive mode control algorithm
If the transition probability distribution functions in Fig. 3 are completely known, it is possible to seek the se-
curity/dependability measures with the optimal mode switching time. However, in general, it is not so easy to iden-
tify the transition behavior of the operational server systems and to know the corresponding probability distribution
functions. As the most plausible scenario, suppose that the transition probability distribution functions Fi, j(t) (i, j ∈
{G, V , A,DL,C,MC,TR,C2, FS,GD, F }) are unknown, but that the associated transition time data in each transition from
state i to j are available. Since only the functions pMC(t0) and pTR(t0) in Eqs. (12) and (13) depend on the decision vari-
able t0, it is worth mentioning that the other quantities in Eqs. (11) and (14)–(24) can be estimated directly from the
underlying transition time data. So, from Eqs. (12) and (13), it is evident to know that a statistical estimator of F A,C (t) is
needed to estimate the steady-state system availability and MTTSF.
Before developing a statistical estimation algorithm for the optimal switching time, we translate the underlying problem
max0<t0<∞ AV(t0) to a graphical one. Deﬁne the scaled total time on test (TTT) transform [3] of the probability distribution
F A,C (t) by
φ(γ ) = 1
μA,C
F−1A,C (γ )∫
0
F A,C (t)dt, (46)
where
F−1A,C (γ ) = inf
{
t0; F A,C (t0) γ
}
, 0 γ  1. (47)
It is well known that F A,C (t) is IHR (DHR) if and only if φ(γ ) is concave (convex) on γ ∈ [0,1] [3]. After a few algebraic
manipulations, we have the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the assumptions (A-1) and (A-2) are satisﬁed. Obtaining the optimal switching time t∗0 maximizing the
steady-state system availability AV(t∗0) is equivalent to obtaining γ ∗ (0 γ ∗  1) such as
max
0γ1
φ(γ ) + c1
γ + c2 , (48)
where
c1 = HG,V
pAμA,C
+ αμDL,G
μA,C (α − β + μDL,G) (> 0), (49)
c2 = μDL,G
β − α − μDL,G (> 0). (50)
From the above result, it is seen that the optimal switching time t∗0 = F−1A,C (γ ∗) is determined by calculating the optimal
point γ ∗ (0  γ ∗  1) maximizing the tangent slope from the point (−c2,−c1) to the curve (γ ,φ(γ )) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] in
the two-dimensional plane. This geometrical procedure seems to be very useful to determine the optimal switching time on
the graph, instead of solving the non-linear equation in Eq. (31). In addition, it would be interesting to perform graphically
the sensitivity analysis of model parameters on the optimal switching time, because the sensitivity can be checked visually
and its educational effect to understand the optimal mode control is beneﬁcial.
Next, suppose that the optimal switching time has to be estimated from an ordered complete (uncensored) observation
0 = x0  x1  x2  · · ·  xn of the transition times from an absolutely continuous distribution F A,C (t), which is unknown.
Then the scaled TTT statistics [3] based on this sample are deﬁned by φnj = ψ j/ψn , where
ψ j =
j∑
(n − k + 1)(xk − xk−1), j = 1,2, . . . ,n; ψ0 = 0. (51)
k=1
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Fnj =
{
j/n for x j  x < x j+1,
1 for xn  x,
(52)
the resulting polygon by plotting the points (Fnj, φnj) ( j = 0,1,2, . . . ,n) and connecting them by line segments is called
the scaled TTT plot [3]. In other words, the scaled TTT plot can be regarded as a numerical counter part of the scaled TTT
transform.
The following result gives an autonomic mode control algorithm based on the non-parametric estimator for the optimal
switching time.
Proposition 3.
(i) Suppose that the optimal switching time has to be estimated from n ordered complete sample 0 = x0  x1  x2  · · · xn from an
absolutely continuous distribution F A,C (t), which is unknown. Then, a non-parametric estimator of the optimal switching time tˆ∗0
which maximizes AV(t0) is given by x j∗ , where
j∗ =
{
j
∣∣ max
0 jn
φnj + c1
j/n + c2
}
(53)
and μA,C in Eq. (49) is replaced by
∑n
k=1 xk/n.
(ii) The estimator given in (i) is strongly consistent, i.e. x j∗ converges to the (real but unknown) optimal solution t∗0 uniformly with
probability one as n → ∞, if a unique optimal switching time exists.
6. Numerical examples
6.1. Preliminaries
In this section we derive the optimal switching time t∗0 characterized in Section 3 and quantify two security mea-
sures; steady-state system availability and MTTSF. Suppose the following parametric circumstance: μG,V = 72, μV ,G = 15,
μV ,A = 24, μDL,G = 15, μMC,G = 12, μTR,F = 6, μTR,C2 = 8, μFS,G = 30, μGD,G = 40 and μF ,G = 48. Also we suppose that
f A,C (t) is the gamma p.d.f. with shape parameter k and scale parameter d:
f A,C (t) = t
k−1d−k exp{−t/d}
Γ (k)
, (54)
where Γ (·) denotes the standard gamma function. Especially we concern the following four cases:
(i) Case 1: p = 0, i.e., the system state makes a transition from C to MC with probability one.
(ii) Case 2: p = 0.5 and q = 0.5.
(iii) Case 3: p = 1 and q = 0, i.e., the service operation at C2 is forced to stop with probability one.
(iv) Case 4: p = 1 and q = 1, i.e., the gracefully degradation can be observed with probability one.
It is evident from Fig. 2 that Case 1 is an unrealistic case because the attack can be always masked perfectly and the
system down does not occur with probability one. In this situation, it is evident to see that the mode switching from an
automatic mode to a manual model is not needed, and that the optimal switching time should be always t∗0 → ∞. Case 3
and Case 4 correspond to the scenario where the probability that the containment with a fail safe function is triggered
is extremely small, and should be considered as the worst case scenario. Especially, Case 4 denotes the case where the
fail-secure function does not also work. This is corresponding to the well-known DoS attack with G , V , A, DL, TR, GD and F ,
where the states MC and FS can be regarded as a security failure state under the DoS attack circumstance [9,10].
In Figs. 5 and 6, we illustrate the behavior of steady-state system availability and MTTSF, respectively. From these ﬁgures,
we know that Case 3 with many service stops gave lower system availability and MTTSF, and that their decreasing rate was
remarkable. Except in Case 1, it is seen that the steady-state system availability is a unimodal function of t0, but that
MTTSF is a monotonically increasing function in each case. From this fact, increasing the optimal switching time leads to
increasing MTTSF which can be regarded as a system lifetime, so that the automatic detection model can work to extend
MTTSF. However, if we focus on the availability, there exists an optimal mode switching time maximizing it in the sense of
long-run operation.
6.2. Sensitivity analysis
We derive the optimal switching time which maximizes the steady-state system availability for varying failure parameters
(k,d). Tables 1 and 2 present the optimal switching time and its associated system availability with varying k and d for
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Table 1
Dependence of steady-state system availability on parameter k in continuous-time operation.
k Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%)
1 ∞ 1 0 0 0.9337 0.3256 0 0.9337 10.5733 0 0.9337 4.2308
2 ∞ 1 0 1.4240 0.9339 0.2251 0.0459 0.9337 10.2650 0.1063 0.9337 4.0513
3 ∞ 1 0 5.0032 0.9345 0.1747 0.6529 0.9338 9.9807 1.0328 0.9339 3.8960
4 ∞ 1 0 9.1387 0.9353 0.1454 1.9098 0.9341 9.7255 2.6739 0.9342 3.7663
5 ∞ 1 0 13.4647 0.9361 0.1263 3.6058 0.9345 9.4938 4.7472 0.9347 3.6549
Case 1–Case 4, where d = 4 is ﬁxed in Table 1, k = 3 is ﬁxed in Table 2, and ‘	’ denotes the increment (%) from the
non-switching time case (t0 → ∞). It can be shown that the steady-state system availability could be improved, especially,
up to 10.6% in Case 3. The main reason why this observation could be obtained was the existence of services frequently
stopped in Case 3. In Table 2, it can be seen that controlling the switching time is quite effective, especially, in Case 3. As
the value of d increases more and more, i.e., the time to detection of intrusions is much longer, the steady-state system
availability monotonically increases.
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Dependence of steady-state system availability on parameter d in continuous-time operation.
d Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 AV(t∗0) 	 (%)
1 ∞ 1 0 0.4524 0.9338 0.3652 0.0783 0.9337 10.6542 0.1209 0.9337 4.2797
4 ∞ 1 0 5.0032 0.9345 0.1747 0.6529 0.9338 9.9807 1.0328 0.9339 3.8960
20 ∞ 1 0 ∞ 0.9436 0 8.1195 0.9352 7.2335 13.8391 0.9361 2.4046
100 ∞ 1 0 ∞ 0.9687 0 0 0.9337 0.6777 ∞ 0.9510 0
Table 3
Dependence of MTTSF on parameter k in continuous-time operation.
k Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%)
1 ∞ ∞ 0 0 2.11E+02 −52.63 0 2.11E+02 −3.40 0 2.11E+02 −3.40
2 ∞ ∞ 0 1.42 2.18E+02 −51.86 0.05 2.11E+02 −5.11 0.11 2.11E+02 −5.09
3 ∞ ∞ 0 5.00 2.32E+02 −49.70 0.65 2.12E+02 −6.52 1.03 2.12E+02 −6.35
4 ∞ ∞ 0 9.14 2.46E+02 −47.72 1.91 2.13E+02 −7.59 2.67 2.14E+02 −7.26
5 ∞ ∞ 0 13.46 2.58E+02 −46.02 3.61 2.15E+02 −8.45 4.75 2.16E+02 −7.95
Table 4
Dependence of MTTSF on parameter d in continuous-time operation.
d Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4
t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%) t∗0 MTTSF(t∗0) 	 (%)
1 ∞ ∞ 0 0.45 2.13E+02 −52.03 0.08 2.11E+02 −2.92 0.12 2.11E+02 −2.90
4 ∞ ∞ 0 5.00 2.32E+02 −49.70 0.65 2.12E+02 −6.52 1.03 2.12E+02 −6.35
20 ∞ ∞ 0 ∞ 5.58E+02 0 8.12 2.19E+02 −20.14 13.84 2.25E+02 −18.06
100 ∞ ∞ 0 ∞ 1.04E+03 0 0 2.11E+02 −58.96 ∞ 5.15E+02 0
In Tables 3 and 4, we calculate the MTTSF with the optimal switching time maximizing system availability. Since DL
is considered as the security failure state, MTTSF decreases arbitrarily by controlling the switching time. Although we
omit to show the detailed mathematical result, it is possible to consider the absorbing state and the transient state as
Xa = {FS,GD, F } and Xt = {G, V , A,DL,MC,TR} in Fig. 4. Then, the corresponding MTTSF could be rather improved, so that
its effect was 5% at the minimum but it provided 1.29×104 times longer system lifetime at the maximum, though we omit
to show them for brevity.
6.3. Simulation experiments
Next, we investigate the asymptotic property of an estimator of the optimal switching time derived in Section 4. Through-
out Monte Carlo simulations, we check the convergence of the estimator x j∗ as the operation time goes on. Based on the
pseudo-random number with the gamma distribution, we generate and monitor the transition times sampled from the
probability distribution F A,C (t) in the simulation experiments. For each sampling, we sequentially estimate the optimal
switching time and calculate the steady-state system availability/MTTSF, based on the ﬁxed sample. We develop a simulator
on Mathematica 5.2, numerical computation software, with ﬁve function modules in Fig. 7. More precisely, we summarize
the function of each module of our simulator in the following:
Step 1 (Data sampling): Deﬁne the time interval from the initial state G to state G again as one cycle, and suppose that the
same cycle repeats again and again up to 800 cycles. In the data sampling, the transition time data from state i to j
(i, j ∈ {G, V , A,DL,C,MC,TR,C2, FS,GD, F }) is recorded in each cycle. On the other hand, in the simulation, the realiza-
tion of each event from state i to j, which is given by the pseudo-random number, is regarded as the transition time
data. The transition time data from state A to state C is generated by the gamma distributed pseudo-random number
with shape parameter k = 5 and scale parameter d = 4. The other transition times are generated by the exponential
distributions with given parameters.
Step 2 (Update): The functionality of this module is to count the number of cycles, update the model parameters and
trace the sample path of the system behavior in each cycle. For instance, in state V , we make a transition to state G
or A whichever occurs ﬁrst. Since the probability distribution F A,C (t) is IHR, the hazard rate is initialized at the initial
state G . Also, the sample means such as μi, j are updated at the beginning of each cycle.
Step 3 (Estimation): Based on the updated sample means, derive the estimates of the optimal switching time and its related
security/dependability measures (availability and MTTSF) in each cycle.
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Step 4 (Evaluation): Calculate estimates of model parameters updated in Step 2 and of the optimal switching time t∗0 in
Step 3. From these values, we calculate estimates of the maximum system availability AV(t∗0) and MTTSF MTTSF(t∗0). We
repeat these steps (Step 2–Step 4) by 800th cycle.
Step 5 (Measurement): The procedure from Step 1 to Step 4 generates only one sample path of an estimate tˆ∗0, AV(tˆ∗0)
or MTTSF(tˆ∗0). To evaluate the temporal behavior of these estimates, it is needed to assess the quality of estimation
with many samples. From the law of large numbers, it can be expected that these sample behaviors approach to the
corresponding real solutions on t∗0, AV(t∗0) or MTTSF(t∗0). Hence, we execute 100 times simulation runs from Step 1 to
Step 4, and calculate the arithmetic means of 100 estimates of t∗0, AV(t∗0) or MTTSF(t∗0) in each cycle.
In Figs. 8–16, we plot the convergence of estimates of the optimal switching time and its related dependability measures,
where the cases with 50 and 100 sample paths are calculated with the arithmetic means of the estimates at each cycle, and
the a dotted line of all ﬁgures is a real solution. It can be observed that the resulting estimates show smoothed curves as the
number of samples increases. In fact, in Figs. 8, 11 and 14, the temporal behavior of estimates on t∗0 with only one sample
ﬂuctuates in Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4, and the resulting estimates do not approach to the real optimal solutions. However,
when the number of samples increases, they tend to converge to a certain level. On the other hand, the steady-state system
availability and MTTSF approach to the corresponding solutions, and the convergence speed becomes much faster when the
number of samples increases. These results imply that it is not suﬃcient to monitor the operational transition behavior of
only one SITAR system. So, it is desired to operate multiple SITAR systems in parallel and monitor the on-line transition
behavior in order to get the mode control strategy with higher accuracy.
It may be interesting to know that the convergence depends on each case under consideration. For instance, in Case 1, it
is found that tˆ∗0 converges at around 700–800 cycles, but AV(tˆ∗0) and MTTSF(tˆ∗0) do at around 150–200 and 300–400 cycles,
respectively. On the other hand, it is seen that tˆ∗0 in Case 3 and Case 4 does not converge even at 800th cycle. While,
AV(tˆ∗0) (MTTSF(tˆ∗0)) in Case 3 and Case 4 converges to the corresponding solutions at around 300–400 and 600–700 cycles
(300–400 and 400–500 cycles). In this way, a large amount of statistical data are needed to estimate the real optimal mode
switching time and its associated dependability measures. The lesson learned from the simulation study is negative to get
the real but unknown optimal mode switching control if the SITAR system is operated independently. In other words, this
problem would be resolved by a good deal of parallelism of server management.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a CTSMC model of an intrusion tolerant system by introducing the switching time
from an automatic detection mode to a manual detection mode. We have derived the optimal switching time analytically
so as to maximize the steady-state system availability and obtained MTTSF. Also, we have developed a statistical estimation
algorithm of the optimal switching time. The lesson learned from numerical examples was that the optimal switching could
improve the system availability/MTTSF effectively in some cases. Hence, it has been shown that the combination between
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computer-based systems. Also, we have made a challenge to estimate asymptotic optimal mode switching strategy and
executed a simulation study. When the transition time data can be obtained from the multiple SITAR operations in parallel,
e.g., 50 or 100 parallel operations, it is possible to estimate the optimal model switching time accurately. In the future, it will
be expected to improve the convergence speed of the estimate proposed in this paper. Then, the kernel-based estimation
may be useful to improve the estimation accuracy and the convergence speed.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Further differentiation of the function q(t0) leads to
q(t0)
dt0
= drA,C (t0)
dt0
{
αT (t0) − (β − μDL,G)U (t0)
}
. (55)
If F A,C (t) is strictly IHR under (A-1) and (A-2), the r.h.s. of Eq. (55) takes a negative value, that is,
αT (t0) − (β − μDL,G)U (t0) = (α − β + μDL,G)
{
HG,V +
∞∫
0
F V ,G(t)dFV ,A(t)
t0∫
0
F A,C (t)dt
}
+ αμDL,G (56)
is strictly negative. Hence, the function q(t0) is a strictly decreasing function of t0 and AV(t0) is strictly quasi-concave
in t0. In this situation, if q(0) > 0 and q(∞) < 0, then there exists a unique t∗0 (0 < t∗0 < ∞) maximizing AV(t0), which
satisﬁes the non-linear equation q(t∗0) = 0. If q(0) 0 or q(∞) 0, then the function AV(t0) decreases or increases, and the
resulting optimal switching time becomes t∗0 = 0 or t∗0 → ∞. On the other hand, if F A,C (t) is DHR, the function AV(t0) is
a quasi-convex function of t0, and the optimal switching time trivially becomes t∗0 = 0 or t∗0 → ∞. 
Proof of Proposition 2. From the deﬁnition in Eq. (48), the steady-state system availability in Eq. (25) is represented as a
function of γ by
AV(t0) = AV
(
F−1A,C (γ )
)
= HG,V /μA,C + pA{φ(γ ) + (α/μA,C )γ }
HG,V /μA,C + pA{φ(γ ) + (μDL,G/μA,C )(1− γ ) + (β/μA,C )γ }
= HG,V /μA,C pA + φ(γ ) + (α/μA,C )γ
HG,V /μA,C pA + (μDL,G/μA,C ) + φ(γ ) + (β − μDL,G)γ /μA,C
= 1+ (α − β + μDL,G)γ /μA,C − μDL,G/μA,C
HG,V /pAμA,C + μDL,G/μA,C + φ(γ ) + (β − μDL,G)γ /μA,C . (57)
Hence, it is obvious that maximizing Eq. (57) is equivalent to minimizing
HG,V /pA + μDL,G + μA,Cφ(γ ) + (β − μDL,G)γ
(α − β + μDL,G)γ − μDL,G =
μA,C
α − β + μDL,G
{
β − μDL,G
μA,C
+ φ(γ ) + c1
γ + c2
}
. (58)
From the assumption (A-1), the proof of Eq. (48) is completed. From the assumption (A-2) and 0 < pA < 1, we have Eqs. (49)
and (50). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Since the estimators, φnj and Fnj are the numerical counterparts of φ(γ ) and γ , respectively, it
is straightforward to hold Eq. (53) in (i) where the population mean μA,C in Eq. (49) is replaced by the sample mean∑n
k=1 xk/n. In (ii), it is well known that φnj and Fnj are both strongly consistent estimators of φ(γ ) and γ , respectively,
i.e. φnj → φ(γ ) and Fnj → γ uniformly with probability one as n → ∞. From the Glivenko–Cantelli theorem, the resulting
estimator of the optimal switching time t∗0 is also strongly consistent [3]. The proof is completed. 
References
[1] A. Avizienis, J.C. Laprie, B. Randell, C. Landwehr, Basic concepts and taxonomy of dependable and secure computing, IEEE Trans. Dependable Secure
Comput. 1 (1) (2004) 11–33.
[2] Y. Deswarte, D. Powell, Internet security: an intrusion-tolerance approach, Proc. IEEE 94 (2) (2006) 432–441.
1774 T. Dohi, T. Uemura / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78 (2012) 1751–1774[3] T. Dohi, N. Kaio, S. Osaki, The total time on test processes and their application to maintenance problems, in: Y. Hayakawa, T. Irony, M. Xie (Eds.),
System and Bayesian Reliability – Essays in Honor of Professor Richard E. Barlow on His 70th Birthday, World Scientiﬁc, 2001, pp. 123–143.
[4] T. Dohi, T. Uemura, Towards autonomic mode control of a scalable intrusion tolerant architecture, in: B. Xie, J. Branke, S.M. Sadjadi, D. Zhang, X. Zhou
(Eds.), The 7th International Conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing (ATC 2010), in: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 6407, Springer-Verlag,
2010, pp. 283–297.
[5] R. Fujimoto, H. Okamura, T. Dohi, Security evaluation of an intrusion tolerant system with MRSPNs, in: Proceedings of 4th International Conference on
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2009), IEEE CS Press, 2009, pp. 427–432.
[6] E. Jonsson, T. Olovsson, A quantitative model of the security intrusion process based on attacker behavior, IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 23 (4) (1997)
235–245.
[7] J. Kephart, D. Chessn, The vision of autonomic computing, IEEE Comput. 36 (2) (2003) 41–50.
[8] B. Littlewood, S. Brocklehurst, N. Fenton, P. Mellor, S. Page, D. Wright, J. Doboson, J. McDermid, D. Gollmann, Towards operational measures of computer
security, J. Comput. Secur. 2 (2/3) (1993) 211–229.
[9] B.B. Madan, K. Goseva-Popstojanova, K. Vaidyanathan, K.S. Trivedi, Modeling and quantiﬁcation of security attributes of software systems, in: Proceed-
ings of 32nd Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2002), IEEE CS Press, 2002, pp. 505–514.
[10] B.B. Madan, K. Goseva-Popstojanova, K. Vaidyanathan, K.S. Trivedi, A method for modeling and quantifying the security attributes of intrusion tolerant
systems, Perform. Eval. 56 (1/4) (2004) 167–186.
[11] R. Ortalo, Y. Deswarte, M. Kaaniche, Experimenting with quantitative evaluation tools for monitoring operational security, IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng. 25 (5)
(1999) 633–665.
[12] B. Park, K. Park, S. Kim, A self-healing mechanism for an intrusion tolerance system, in: S. Katsikas, J. Lopez, G. Pernul (Eds.), Trust, Privacy and Security
in Digital Business (TrustBus 2005), in: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 3592, Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 41–49.
[13] T. Uemura, T. Dohi, Quantitative evaluation of intrusion tolerant systems subject to DoS attacks via semi-Markov cost models, in: M.K. Denko, C.-S.
Shih, K.-C. Li, S.-L. Tsao, Q.-A. Zeng, S.-H. Park, Y.-B. Ko, S.-H. Hung, J.-H. Park (Eds.), Emerging Directions in Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, in:
Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 4809, Springer-Verlag, 2007, pp. 31–42.
[14] T. Uemura, T. Dohi, Optimizing security measures in an intrusion tolerant database system, in: T. Nanya, F. Maruyama, A. Pataricza, M. Malek (Eds.),
Service Availability: 5th International Service Availability Symposium, in: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 501, Springer-Verlag, 2008, pp. 26–42.
[15] T. Uemura, T. Dohi, Optimal security patch management policies maximizing system availability, J. Commun. 5 (1) (2010) 71–80.
[16] T. Uemura, T. Dohi, N. Kaio, Availability analysis of a scalable intrusion tolerant architecture with two detection modes, in: M.G. Jaatun, G. Zhao, C. Rong
(Eds.), Proceedings of 1st International Conference on Cloud Computing (CloudCom 2009), in: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 5931, Springer-Verlag,
2009, pp. 178–189.
[17] T. Uemura, T. Dohi, N. Kaio, Availability analysis of an IMS-based VoIP network system, in: D. Taniar, O. Gervasi, B. Murgante, E. Pardede, B.O. Apduhan
(Eds.), Computational Science and Its Applications Part IV (ICCSA 2010), in: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 6019, Springer-Verlag, 2010, pp. 441–456.
[18] T. Uemura, T. Dohi, N. Kaio, Availability analysis of an intrusion tolerant distributed server system with preventive maintenance, IEEE Trans. Reliab.
59 (1) (2010) 18–29.
[19] T. Uemura, T. Dohi, N. Kaio, Dependability analysis of a scalable intrusion tolerant architecture with two detection modes, J. Internet Technol. 11 (2)
(2010) 289–298.
[20] A.H. Wang, S. Yan, P. Liu, A semi-Markovian survivability evaluation model for intrusion tolerant database systems, in: Proceedings of 5th International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2010), IEEE CS Press, 2010, pp. 427–432.
[21] D. Wang, B.B. Madan, K.S. Trivedi, Security analysis of SITAR intrusion tolerance system, in: Proceedings of 2nd Annual IEEE Systems, Man and Cyber-
netics, Information Assurance Workshop, ACM, 2003, pp. 23–32.
[22] F. Wang, F. Gong, C. Sargor, K. Goseva-Popstojanova, K.S. Trivedi, F. Jou, SITAR: A scalable intrusion-tolerant architecture for distributed services, in:
Proceedings of 2nd Annual IEEE Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Information Assurance Workshop, IEEE Press, 2001.
[23] H. Wang, P. Liu, Modeling and evaluating the survivability of an intrusion tolerant database system, in: D. Gollmann, J. Meier, A. Sabelfeld (Eds.),
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security 2006, in: Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 4189, Springer-Verlag, 2006, pp. 207–224.
